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The remarks and suggestions made by foster care graduates con-
tained a recurrent theme-the importance of consultation with the
young people themselves. They felt like pawns-subject to the
many powers of others. They felt disregarded, that it did not matter
what they wanted or had to say, because too often they were never
asked. Whether it was a decision about a foster home, about
* Director and Associate Director, respectively, University of Miami School of
Law, Children & Youth Law Clinic, and counsel for petitioner in M. W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d
90 (Fla. 2000).
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changes in placement, about visiting arrangements with kin, or
about their goals in life, they felt they should have been heard.'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE STORY OF MICHAEL AND HIS
STRUGGLE TO BE HEARD
"Michael" is a teenage foster child who was committed by the Florida
Department of Children & Families ("DCF') to a psychiatric institution after
a five-minute hearing at which he was not present, in which he had no
opportunity to participate, and at which no evidence was presented. The
commitment order signed by the juvenile court judge required Michael to be
transported under armed police escort to the institution. While at this institu-
tion, Michael was forcibly administered psychotropic drugs, placed in four-
point leather restraints, and punished by being placed in seclusion, prohib-
ited from speaking to other patients, or telephoning his family.
Michael was one of nine children born in Miami to a poor, single
mother. At the age of six, Michael and his siblings were removed from his
mother's custody and placed in foster care due to allegations of abuse and
neglect. During his many years in state custody, Michael was placed by
DCF in several different settings, including foster homes, group homes,
hospitals, and his mother's home. While in foster care, he sometimes ran to
his mother's home.
During his long period in foster care, Michael was also hospitalized on
several occasions for crisis stabilization and evaluations. Two doctors who
evaluated Michael during one of these hospital stays disagreed as to the type
of placement that was appropriate for him. One, a psychiatrist, recom-
mended "'a residential placement emphasizing self-responsibility, self-
identity, and independent living skills .... ,,,2 Another, a psychologist,
recommended that a foster placement in which the foster mother would be
most "'accessible and available"' to this adolescent child would be most
therapeutic. 3 Michael's court-appointed attorney asked the court to appoint
another psychologist to perform an independent examination. The indepen-
dent psychologist recommended that Michael be given "individual therapY ,
psychotropic medications, and that he be placed in therapeutic foster care. '
Later, his case was reviewed by a DCF multi-disciplinary case review
committee charged under Florida law with determining children's eligibility
1. TRUDY FESTINGER, No ONE EVER ASKED Us: A POSTSCRIPT TO FOSTER CARE 296
(1983).
2. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
3. Id. at 93.
4. Id. at 94.
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for residential treatment.5 The committee considered another assessment,
one prepared by a psychologist hired by DCF. This assessment opined that
Michael "'did not appear to be at risk for suicidal attempts or self-injurious
behaviors but he is at risk for running away and the dangers associated with
this.' 6 The psychologist, however, recommended Michael's placement in a
"'supportive, but locked residential environment wherein [Michael] will be
able to develop relationships with others and can participate in family ther-
apy .... ,, Without interviewing Michael, or hearing from Michael's court-
appointed lawyer, the committee adopted this psychologist's recommenda-
tion.
8
DCF then appeared in court and asked Michael's presiding juvenile
court judge to order than he be placed in a locked residential environment.
9
Michael's attorney asked the judge, prior to ordering this placement, to
allow an evidentiary hearing under the Baker Act i to take place in order to
sort out the conflicting evidence and allow Michael to present evidence that
residential placement was not necessary." The dependency judge refused to
conduct such a hearing, found that a locked residential placement was
"appropriate," and set an evidentiary hearing six weeks later, over the pro-
tests of Michael's attorney.'
2
While in the locked program, Michael was interviewed by a newspaper
reporter. The reporter described him in the following manner:
Michael has been confined to Lock Towns for more than a year. He
turned 16 inside the pink walls and behind locked metal doors. He
is not allowed out, except to go to court or see a doctor. When he
does leave, Lock Towns' staff puts his legs in shackles to prevent
him from running away .... He is on several powerful drugs, and
he says he has been mistreated and harshly punished. "It feels like
I'm in jail," Michael said. To an untrained eye, Michael does not
appear to be disturbed. He answers questions thoughtfully though
with few words. He likes the Dallas Cowboys and Denver Broncos
and has a teen-ager's awkward shyness. As he sits in his case-
5. See FLA. ADMiN. CODEANN. r. 65E-10.018 (2001).




10. FLA. STAT. § 394.451-.4789 (2000). The Act is also known as The Florida
Mental Health Act. See § 394.467.




worker's office, he fidgets with her computer. He downs two orange
sodas and a large bag of potato chips.
13
Michael's story is not an isolated, or even unusual, one. In No One
Ever Asked Us: A Postscript to Foster Care,14 the author reported on an
extensive study on the views of former foster care youth. 15 One of the most
"unsettling and confusing" aspects of a foster child's is the experience of
moving from one foster home to another, or from a foster home to a psychi-
atric hospital, or from a foster home to a temporary shelter.16 The youths
surveyed in the study had no opportunity to be heard before such changes in
placement occurred . Foster children felt bounced around like a "ping-pong
ball," to use their words.1 8 "'There has to be a greater understanding that
one is moving people, not furniture' and 'Children are not objects ... like
merchandise' were common refrains."' 9 No change in placement is more
traumatic to a foster child than the removal from a foster home and an
alternative commitment to a locked psychiatric institution.
The commitment of foster children to long-term, locked psychiatric
institutions is a matter of great importance affecting the privacy and liberty
rights of many foster children in the state's custody. This article will ad-
dress the right of a foster child to procedural due process prior to commit-
ment to a psychiatric institution. First, the article will provide an overview
of the Supreme Court of Florida's holding in M. W. v. Davis20 and the context
of the decision. Second, the article will review the relevant Florida statutes
that govern the psychiatric commitment of a foster child in state custody.
Third, the article will address the foster child's right to privacy under the
Florida Constitution when the state seeks to commit the child to a psychiatric
institution. Fourth, the article will discuss what procedural safeguards
should be set forth in the new rule of court that resulted from the M. W.
decision. Finally, the article will review the therapeutic jurisprudence con-
siderations that were implicated by the M.W. decision, which support greater
13. Sally Kestin, At 16, He's Behind Locked Doors, State as Parent Denies Rights to
Foster Kids, SuN-SFNTnB- (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 7, 1999, at A25.
14. FESTINGER, supra note 1.




19. Id. at 275. "Placement in foster care undermines the children's interpersonal
trust, sense of mastery, and control over events within the environment." Wendy Glockner
Kates, et al., Whose Child Is This? Assessment and Treatment of Children in Foster Care, 61
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 584, 585 (Oct. 1991).
20. 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
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procedural due process for children in state custody who face psychiatric
commitment.
I. M.W. V. DAVIS
A. Procedural History of the Litigation
The M. W. decision was the culmination of a two-year battle waged on
behalf of Michael, a seventeen-year-old who spent ten years in the foster
care system. Michael experienced multiple placements during that time after
which he was ordered into the residential treatment program at Lock Towns
Adolescent Care Program, a locked psychiatric facility on the grounds of
South Florida State Hospital,2 1 after a five-minute hearing in the juvenile
court.
Michael and his counsel, members of the University of Miami Children
& Youth Law Clinic,22 appeared at the hearing, but were denied the opportu-
nity to present evidence that he did not meet the criteria under the Baker Act
to be involuntarily placed in such a restrictive setting.23 The trial court set
an evidentiary hearing more than six weeks after his placement.24 Shortly
after his placement in Lock Towns, the Clinic filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, arguing that the commitment
was illegal because the trial court failed to provide a pre-placement adversar-
ial hearing with findings by clear and convincing evidence that involuntary
commitment was required and that no less restrictive treatment alternative
was available.2 The district court initially agreed, and granted the writ,
holding that Michael's commitment by DCF violated his rights to an adver-
sarial hearing under sections 39.407(4) and 394.467 of the Florida Stat-
utes.2
On DCF's motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc and certification, the
district court withdrew its earlier opinion and denied the child's petition for
habeas corpus relief, holding that no further hearing on Michael's commit-
27ment was required. The court of appeal denied further rehearing requested
21. Id. at 95 n.12.
22. Counsel was appointed by the dependency court as an attorney ad litem. Id. at 92
n.3.
23. Id. at 95.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. M.W. v. Davis, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2419 (4th Dist. Ct. App., Oct. 27, 1998),
withdrawn on reh'g, 722 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
27. M.W., 722 So. 2d at 969.
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by Michael, but certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of great
public importance the following question:
IS A HEARING WHICH COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF SECTIONS 39.407(4) AND 394.467(1), FLORIDA
STATUTES, NECESSARY WHEN A COURT ORDERS THAT A
CHILD BE PLACED IN A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY FOR
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, WHERE THE CHILD HAS
BEEN COMMITTED TO THE LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE DE-
PARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES AND
THE DEPARTMENT IS SEEKING RESIDENTIAL TREAT-
MENT?
28
The Supreme Court of Florida held that neither the statutory framework
in chapter 39, nor the United States Constitution, requires an evidentiary
hearing that complies with section 394.467(1), before the juvenile court
orders a child in the legal custody of DCF to be placed in a residential
facility for mental health treatment. 29 However, the court stated that "[a]n
order approving the placement of a fifteen-year-old dependent child in a
locked residential facility against the wishes of that child deprives that child
of liberty and requires clear-cut procedures to be followed by the depend-
ency court judge. ' 30 The court directed the Juvenile Court Rules Committee
to develop a rule that above all that affords the child "a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard" before the court orders the child's placement against his
will in a psychiatric institution.31
The court instructed the Juvenile Court Rules Committee to prepare a
proposed rule that will set forth the procedures to be followed by the de-
pendency court that " ive[s] due regard to both the rights of the child and the
child's best interests."
28. M.W. v. Davis, 729 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The certified
question prompted the filing of several amicus briefs in the Supreme Court of Florida in the
case of M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 91 (Ha. 2000), including one filed jointly by the ACLU
Foundation of Florida, the Children First Project at Nova Southeastern University Shepard
Broad Law Center, the Advocacy Center for Persons With Disabilities, the National Associa-
tion of Counsel for Children, and others by the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County's
Juvenile Advocacy Project and the Guardian Ad Litem Program for the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit, reflecting the importance of this litigation to children's, civil rights, and disability
rights advocates throughout the state and nation.
29. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 92.
30. Id. at 107.




B. M.W. in Context: Residential Treatment of "Troublesome" Youth
The M. W. litigation was brought against a backdrop of growing skepti-
cism about the effectiveness, necessity, and cost benefit value of residential
treatment of emotionally disturbed or behaviorally disordered children and
adolescents in state care. In recent years, advocates for children and mental
patients have voiced and documented their concerns about the overuse and
misuse of private mental hospitals to institutionalize "trouble-some youth"
diagnosed with relatively mild adolescent disorders such as "conduct disor-
der," "oppositional defiant disorder," and "adolescent adjustment reac-
tion. 33 Many of these youths "do not appear to suffer from anything more
serious than normal developmental changes" associated with adolescence.34
According to Ira M. Schwartz, Dean of the School of Social Work at the
University of Pennsylvania, who has criticized the mental hospitalization of
"oppositional" adolescents, "[t]hese names sound as though they have
diagnostic precision.., but they don't."35  In fact, they include a wide
variety of typical teenage behaviors: running away, aggression, opposition
to parental values and rules, engaging in excessive sexual activity, or serious
antisocial behavior.3 6
Increasingly, in recent years, child welfare, juvenile justice, and mental
health policy experts have come to regard residential treatment as an ineffec-
tive, unnecessary, and expensive solution to these problems, which can
usually be treated through less restrictive, community-based interven-tions
such as therapeutic foster care and family builder programs.37 In Florida,
33. See, e.g., Lois A. Weithom, Note, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth:
An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773, 788-91 (1988) (noting
that "fewer than one-third of juveniles admitted for in-patient psychiatric treatment were
diagnosed with severe or acute disorders such as psychotic, serious depressive, or organic
disorders as necessary for such admissions").
34. Id. at 789.
35. Nina Darnton, Committed Youth: Why Are So Many Teens Being Locked Up in
Private Mental Hospitals?, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1989, at 66, 68; see also IRA M. SCHWARTZ,
Rethinking the Best Interests of the Child, in JUSTICE FOR JUVENILEs 131-48 (Lexington
Books 1989) (characterizing unnecessary hospitalization as "being abused at better prices").
36. Darnton, supra note 35, at 68.
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL'S
CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN'S MENTAL HFALTH (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral
gov/cmh/childreport.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (noting the positive evidence favoring
home and community based care for severely emotionally disturbed children in contrast to
traditional forms of institutional care which can have deleterious consequences); see also U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
(1999), available at http:llwww.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter3/sec7.html
(last visited Sept. 8, 2001) (recommending alternatives to institutionalization for the mentally
2001]
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this skepticism was fueled by revelations over the years that many children
locked up in long-term treatment facilities are often mistreated, overmedi-
cated, abused, and held longer than therapeutically warranted. Newspapers
throughout Florida for the past decade have published chilling accounts of
children being asphyxiated by "basket hold" physical restraints administered
by staff in psychiatric hospitals to de-escalate aggressive behavior, children
with mild emotional disturbances shackled and overmedicated in facilities
for the acutely disturbed, and children confined in psychiatric wards months
and years after being discharged because DCF has nowhere else to put
them. 8
Nationally, a review of data from several states has indicated that at
least forty percent of children and youth committed to psychiatric institu-
tions are inappropriately placed. 39 Also, studies of the psychiatric commit-
ill, including outpatient treatment, community-based interventions, therapeutic foster and
group home care, and family support programs); GARY B. MELTON, ET AL., No PLACE TO Go:
THE CIvIL COMMITMENT OF MINORS (1998) (recommending that states support family-based
alternatives to inpatient hospitalization of minors, including respite care, as a means of
preserving families and ensuring alternatives to inpatient psychiatric treatment); FLA. COMM'N
ON MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, REPORT OF CHILDREN'S WORKGROUP (2000),
available at http://cmhsa.fmhi.usf.edu/finalreport/children.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2001)
(noting that the shortage of therapeutic foster placements for children with mental health
problems creates a situation where adolescents remain unnecessarily in residential placements
because of the absence of appropriate placements in less restrictive programs); NAT'L COMM'N
ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AGENDA FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES (1991)
(observing that traditional psychotherapy is often unavailable to children in low-income
families, and that even if it is available, it is typically isolated from other health, education,
and social services that these children and their families need).
38. See, e.g., Steve Patterson, Troubled Kids Left in Center Too Long, FLA. TIMES-
UNION, Mar. 12, 2000, at Al; William Cooper, Jr., Alternative to "Basket Hold" Restraint
Demanded State's Limited Options Leave Children in Limbo, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 6,
1998, at 1C; William Cooper, Jr., Mentally Ill Teen's Homicide Haunts Her Father, Workers
Who Restrained Her Placed on Leave, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 26, 1998, at 1B; Candy
Hatcher, Meet Samantha: Her Only Family is the State, PALM BEACH POST, June 12, 1994, at
IA; Karen Samples & Donna Pazdera, Crisis Center to Adjust Plan Keeps Unruly Teens Out
of Unit, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 8, 1993, at 5B; Mary Brooks, Drug-Treatment
Program is in Trouble with State Again, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 11, 1991 at D3; Carol
Gentry, Child's Death Spurs Inquiry, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991, at lB.
39. Weithorn, supra note 33, at 784 n.72 (quoting J. KNrzER, UNCLAIMED CHILDREN:
THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN NEED OF MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES 46 (1982) (reviewing agency reports from several states)). "'Inappropriate-
ness' was judged on the basis of factors such as whether the children could have been served
as outpatients or in day treatment, and whether the severity of the children's diagnoses
warranted inpatient treatment." Id. Indeed, "'at least 40% of children and youth in state
hospitals could have been treated in less restrictive settings, by the states' own admission."'
[Vol. 25:725
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ment of adolescents have shown that "[flewer than one-third of those chil-
dren admitted for inpatient mental health treatment were diagnosed as having
severe or acute mental disorders of the type typically associated with such
admissions (such as psychotic, serious depressive, or organic disorders). '"
Disturbingly, "the rising rates of psychiatric admission of children and
adolescents reflect an increasing use of hospitalization to manage a popula-
tion for whom such intervention is typically inappropriate: 'troublesome'
youth who do not suffer from severe mental disorders.'
Many of the "troublesome" youth who are committed to psychiatric
institutions are children who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected and
placed in state foster care. Indeed:
[A] very large proportion of children in mental hospitals and other
residential treatment facilities are wards of the state .... The GAO
[General Accounting Office] found that half of the youths institu-
tionalized in 'health' facilities in the three states it examined (Flor-
ida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin) were referred by welfare authori-
ties. [citing Residential care: Patterns of child placement in three
states (report No. GAO/PEMD-85-2)] .... Once children are
placed in state custody, a new set of problems emerge. Social ser-
vice placements often are far from children's families and there-
fore, promote an institutional climate. Children find themselves
amid a slow bureaucracy in which they are stuck in restrictive set-
tings for long periods of time without effective recourse.
42
Children who are committed to psychiatric institutions remain there
indefinitely. In fact, once hospitalized, juvenile psychiatric 4patients remain
in the institution approximately twice as long as do adults. Additionally,
foster children who are in state custody remain institutionalized longer than
children who are in their parents' custody."4 Indeed, as the United States
Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he absence of an adult who cares deeply for a
child has little effect on the reliability of the initial admission decision, but it
may have some effect on how long a child will remain in the hospital....
MELTON, supra note 37, at 37 (emphasis in original) (citing J. KNrrzER, UNCLAIMED
CHILDREN: THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC REsPONsmrrY To CHILDREN AND ADoLEscENTS IN NnaD
OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (1982)).
40. Weithorn, supra note 33, at 788.
41. Id. at 773-74.
42. MELTON, supra note 37, at 15-16 (citations omitted).
43. Weithom, supra note 33, at 789.
44. MELTON, supra note 37, at 16.
2001]
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For a child without natural parents, we must acknowledge the risk of being
'lost in the shuffle."'
45
Sound policy reasons should prevent a state child welfare agency from
being equated with a parent for the purpose of institutionalizing a child.
"'The importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the
intimacy of daily association.... "46 A natural parent who makes treatment
decisions is emotionally bonded with the child, observes the child on a
regular basis, and knows the child's history. By contrast, as a foster child
navigates the child's journey through state custody, the child interacts with a
long series of state agents-social workers, shelter staff, foster parents, etc.
Unlike a parent, a state agency granted temporary legal custody of a child
does not form an emotional attachment with a child and does not achieve
"the intimacy of daily association.
'A7
In recent years, literally hundreds of foster children in Florida placed in
residential treatment centers by the state have been "lost in the shuffle.
4
45. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 619 (1979) (holding that the child's Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are not violated when a parent or the state commits a child to a
psychiatric facility without a formal due process hearing, but requiring independent review of
the child's condition after commitment to the facility as a necessary check against possible
arbitrariness in the initial admission decision).
46. In re E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 973 (1995) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977)).
47. As Gary B. Melton and his collaborators, in their examination of the legal
framework and policy relating to the commitment of minors to residential treatment, observe:
Mhe notion of identical interests between foster child and state guardian is non-
sensical. With the turnover in state social workers, large caseloads, and, most im-
portantly, lack of family ties, the contention that guardians can and will protect the
interests of their wards in the same manner as watchful parents defies common
sense .... Also, because state social workers are part of the very bureaucracy that
is responsible for the administration or regulation of residential treatment facilities,
they may have little discretion in monitoring the welfare of their wards placed
within them .... At a minimum, state social workers are apt to have the appear-
ance of a conflict of interest. Therefore, rejection of the myth of 'voluntary'
placement of children is especially important when the admitting 'parent' is the
state guardian.
MELTON, supra note 37, at 157-58.
48. According to DCF, approximately 800 children were admitted to residential
treatment centers or therapeutic group homes during fiscal year 1997-1998 for the purpose of
receiving treatment for emotional disturbance. SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEENT, CS/SB 682 (2000). The agency also reported that during fiscal year
1998-1999, there were 411 residential placements of children and 877 other placements in
therapeutic group homes funded through the DCF children's mental health budget. Id.
Perlmutteri Salisbury
The South Florida Sun-Sentinel in a series of articles examining Florida's
practice of warehousing these children in private residential treatment
programs reported:
In Florida, some children have been sent to locked
treatment centers simply because the state has no place else to put
them .... Once confined, some children have spent years in treat-
ment centers because of the state's perennial lack of foster homes.
The average length of stay in a treatment centers statewide is nine
months. But in some parts of the state, it is much higher: sixteen
months in Gainesville for instance, and two years in Tampa.
49
Erroneous placement in a residential treatment facility can have an
extremely harmful and traumatic impact on a child:
A recent review of psychological research concluded that
certain degrees of freedom of movement, association, and commu-
nication are critical to the psychological well-being of children and
adolescents. Mental hospitalization may entail substantial periods
of isolation, particularly in the case of recalcitrant children and
adolescents, and may be characterized by involuntary admini-
stration of heavy doses of psychotropic medication (that is, medica-
tion used to alter psychological functioning), invasions of privacy,
and social pressure to conform behavior to certain norms....
Certain aspects of mental hospitalization can be extremely
frightening for some children. Children who are not seriously emo-
tionally disturbed may be greatly upset by exposure to children
who are. In addition to the possible assault on one's psychological
well-being, an involuntary hospitalization may be harmful to one's
physical health....'50
Moreover, children erroneously committed to mental hospitals often experi-
ence behavioral deterioration because "[t]he psychiatric hospital can also be
a place to learn some previously unconsidered behaviors, such as suicide
attempts." 51
49. Sally Kestin, No Place Else to Go Florida Has Never Measured the Effectiveness
of Treatment Centers for Troubled Children, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1999, at
IA.
50. Weithom, supra note 33, at 797 (footnotes omitted) (citing MELTON, ET AL., No
PLACETO GO: THE CIVILCOMMrIMENT OF MINORS (1998)).
5 1. Gerald P. Koocher, M.D., Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Child-
ren's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REv. 711,723 (1992). Moreover, "[tihe stigma of a history of [psy-
chiatric] institutional placement also is well-known. The effects on youth who are on the
2001]
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Furthermore, many children are abused in psychiatric institutions. The
abusive treatment to which Florida's foster children have often been sub-
jected in psychiatric facilities throughout this state has long been docu-
52mented. One instance of children being abused in psychiatric institutions
was brought to light by Broward County Court Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren
and substantiated by the DCF Inspector General.53
In March of 1999, during a visit to the Brown Schools of Florida, a
thirty-bed residential facility for emotionally disturbed children in Sunrise,
Florida, Judge Lerner-Wren witnessed a staff member twisting the arm of a
fourteen-year-old pregnant patient in the program.54 Alarmed by what she
had witnessed and by other accounts of abuses and overmedication of chil-
dren in the program, Judge Lerner-Wren scheduled hearings for all children
at the Brown Schools under her jurisdiction, citing "'significant safety
concerns"' about their treatment. 55 The heightened judicial scrutiny of the
children in the facility, and resulting media coverage, prompted the Secretary
of DCF, Kathleen Kearney, to send in teams of experts from Tallahassee
program offices to investigate allegations of improper restraint in the facil-
ity.
DCF's Inspector General launched a separate investigation of the
program. Its August 1999 report found that the majority of the children could
be treated on an outpatient basis in less restrictive, non-residential settings,
with quality case management, wrap-around treatment and support.57 Over
half of the children in the program had been improperly admitted. At least
one quarter did not have a diagnosed major mental illness. The report was
verge of applying for jobs, seeking insurance, and so forth may be especially pernicious."
MELTON, supra note 37, at 47 (citations omitted).
52. See generally newspaper articles, supra note 38.
53. See Shana Gruskin, State: Restraints Overused on Youths, Brown Schools
Monitoring Flawed, SuN-SENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 17, 1999, at 4B.
54. See Sally Kestin, State Team to Review Youth Center Restraints, Brown Schools
Monitoring Flawed, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 25, 1999, at 1A.
55. Id.
56. Id. Concerns about the injuries and even deaths suffered by children in psychiat-
ric hospitals because of the excessive use of force by hospital staff while physically restraining
them are by no means confined to Florida. See, e.g., Blint & Poitras, Boy, 11, Crushed
During Restraint: Aides at Psychiatric Facility Put on Leave During Probe, HARTFORD
COuRANT, Mar. 24, 1998, at Al.
57. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, INTERNAL AuDrr, MANAGEmENT REVIEW OF
TmE BROWN SCHOOLS OF FLORIDA, INC. (covering July 1, 1998 through April 1, 1999) (finding
violations of DCF administrative protocols for the placement of emotionally disturbed
children in residential treatment; no multi-disciplinary eligibility assessments for many
children admitted to the facility; improper uses of chemical and physical restraints; and
incomplete abuse and neglect incident reports); see also Gruskin, supra note 53, at 4B.
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especially critical of the "serious shortage of this level non-residential inten-
sive, individualized mental health treatment" programs for DCF children in
Broward 8
The lack of available placements for emotionally disturbed children in
Broward County, and the "abusive practice" of housing these children at
"assessment centers," without providing them necessary mental health treat-
ment or medical services, was the subject of a separate round of news arti-
cles in Broward and court hearings before Judge Lerner-Wren
5 9
C. Sun-Sentinel Series: "Throwaway Kids"
The most disturbing revelations about conditions in children's psychiat-
ric facilities in Florida came to light in November of 1999, when the South
Florida Sun-Sentinel published a seventeen-part investigative series on the
state's practice of locking up children in costly psychiatric institutions where
many did not belong, where many languished months and years after com-
pleting treatment, and where care and treatment provided to children con-
fined in these institutions was often of dubious value.0 The series graphi-
cally documented the treatment (or maltreatment) provided to the more than
500 children "too troubled for foster care... grow[ing] up in institutions,"
costing taxpayers up to $109,500 a year per child, often subjected to physical
and sexual abuse, overmedication, and the imprl er use of physical re-
straints, resulting in serious injuries and even death.
The series reported the children were sent to these residential treatment
centers which operate with lax or no oversight or regulation from govern-
ment agencies such as DCF and the Agency for Health Care Administra-
58. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 57, at 4.
59. See Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (affirming juvenile court order for in camera production of records of emotionally
disturbed children housed at DCF "assessment center" pending their placement by DCF in
appropriate therapeutic settings); see also Shana Gruskin, Judges' Role in DCF Clarified:
Appeals Court Ruling Pleases Both Sides, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 2 1999, at
lB. The chronic shortages of suitable therapeutic placements for children in the legal custody
of the Department of Children and Families has been the subject of a long-pending statewide
class action lawsuit against state officials in Florida. Third Amended Complaint for Declara-
tory and Injunctive Relief, M.E. v. Bush, No. 90-1008-Civ-Moore (S.D. Fla. 1997).
60. See Sally Kestin, Throwaway Kids, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 6-9,
1999, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/specials/throwawaykids.
61. See Sally Kestin, Too Troubled for Foster Care, Kids Grow Up in Institutions,
SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 6, 1999, at IA.
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62tion. It cited reports by the state showing that at least one quarter of the
children placed in these programs did not belong there, but were confined in
these facilities because the state had nowhere else to place them.63 It chroni-
cled cases of parents relinquishing custody of children to the foster care
system in order to access needed, but costly, mental health treatment, and
then unable to reclaim custody of their children from that very system after
becoming frustrated with the abuses suffered by their children in that resi-
dential care.64 The effectiveness of treatment, utilizing rigid and often
punitive behavior modification techniques and other controls, also was
called into question. 65  Additionally, the series reported that numerous
children had been subjected to overuse of physical restraints, seclusion,
illegal communication restrictions, and overmedication with psychotropic
drugs, and that many of the children had also been victims of emotional,
66
physical, and sexual abuse while locked up in the institutions. Children
were placed in the care of poorly trained, poorly educated staff who some-
times abused them. 67 The articles disclosed at least fifty-five cases of chil-
dren abused or neglected by staff in these institutions over the preceding
68three years.
Finally, spurred by the revelations in the Sun-Sentinel series, DCF
responded to the serious concerns of these children and sent teams of inspec-
tors to eight treatment centers. 69 DCF terminated its $1.4 million annual
62. Sally Kestin, Children's Centers Lack Oversight, Treatment Facilities Operate
with Few Regulations and with Little Monitoring by State or Federal Governments, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 9, 1999 at IA.
63. Kestin, supra note 49.
64. Sally Kestin, Parents Helpless After State Assumes Custody, StN-SENTIN.L (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 6, 1999, at 1A. This predicament has challenged parents of mentally ill
children across the nation. For at least the past two decades, parents in many states, including
Florida, have been confronted with the dilemma of giving up custody of children to the child
welfare or juvenile justice system in order to obtain publicly funded treatment for their
children's mental health problems. See generally BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH
LAw, RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET CHILDREN'S
MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS (Mar. 2000).
65. Sally Kestin, Treatment's Results Hard to Gauge Lacking Standards, the State is
Unable to Judge the Effectiveness of Children's Therapy in Psychiatric Centers, SUN-
SE24TIEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1999, at 19A; Sally Kestin, The Rules Are Strict, the
Punishment Swift and Stiff, Experts Disagree on Whether Some Centers' Rigid Structure
Benefits Children or Hurts Them, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1999, at 19A.
66. Sally Kestin, Environment Sometimes Leads to Abuse Investigations Lack Depth,
Children's Input, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 9, 1999, at 6A.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sally Kestin, State Goes After Youth Centers Crackdown Aimed at Halting Abuse,
Neglect, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), June 18, 2000, at 13A.
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contract with Lock Towns, which housed Matthew for almost two years.
7°
The agency found that staff used excessive force in restraining children and
the staff gave powerful medications to control their behavior but did not
monitor these children for side effects.71 DCF also found Lock Towns did
not provide youths with individual therapy and unlicensed, unqualified
workers were conducting most group therapy sessions.72 According to the
chief of mental health services for DCF in Miami-Dade County, "[w]hat
stopped me in my tracks was there was no therapist on staff [at Lock Towns]
since February.... These are some of our sickest kids. That is just unac-
ceptable.
,73
D. The New Legislation
In response to the Sun-Sentinel Throwaway Kids series' revelations
about the many abuses of children in residential treatment centers, Democrat
Senator Howard Forman, of Pembroke Pines, co-sponsored legislation in the
2000 session.74 The legislation is designed to provide greater legal protec-
tion for children inappropriately admitted to or held in psychiatric facili-
ties.
75
Addressing the Sun-Sentinel's concerns about lax regulation of residen-
tial programs by state agencies, the new legislation requires children's resi-
dential treatment centers to be licensed and regulated by the Agency for
Health Care Administration ("AHCA"). 76 The legislation also directs DCF,
in consultation with AHCA, to issue rules governing residential treatment
centers for children and adolescents which specify licensure standards for a
number of the problems identified in the series."7 These include: admission,
length of stay, program and staffing, discharge and discharge planning, treat-




73. Id. The children in the Lock Towns program were moved to different facilities
throughout South Florida. Id. Fourteen were transferred to a facility on the grounds of South
Florida State Hospital, operated by Citrus Health Network, in a building described by the DCF
mental health chief as "much nicer." Id.
74. CS/SB 682 (Fla. 2000); HB 2347 (Fla. 2000).
75. Sally Kestin, Bill Would Add Legal Protection for Kids, SUN-SETINEi. (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 29, 1999, at lB.




section 394.459 of the Florida Statutes, use of psychotropic medications,
and standards for the operation of such centers.78
The bill also amended portions of chapters 39 and 394 by requiring
guardians ad litem to represent children and to have a suitability examination
and assessment conducted by a "qualified evaluator" appointed by the
Agency for Health Care Administration before being placed in residential
treatment centers.79
The legislation, which took effect October 1, 2000, provides procedural
safeguards for children, after their placement in the facilities by DCF, to
ensure they are not institutionalized for lengthy periods of time without
judicial oversight. It requires DCF to notify the court and the child's guard-
ian, "[i]mmediately upon placing a child in a residential treatment program,"
that the child has been placed in a facility. 80 The residential treatment
program must report monthly to DCF and the guardian on the child's pro-
gress and DCF must submit monthly status reports to the juvenile court.
81
The legislation further provides a court hearing shall take place no later than
three months after the child's placement in the program, that includes a
clinical review by a qualified evaluator addressing the need for continued
residential placement. Further, judicial reviews must be conducted every
78. Id. Proposed rule 65E-9 of the Florida Administrative Code Annotated, govern-
ing licensure of children's residential treatment centers, was published in 27 Fla. Adin.
Weekly 8 (Feb. 23, 2001), but advocates have criticized the limited public notice and com-
ment opportunities afforded by DCF, in violation of section 120.54(2)(c) of the Florida
Statutes. Letter from Brent R. Taylor, Policy Director, Advocacy Center for Persons with
Disabilities, to Jim Poindexter, Operations and Management Consultant, Department of
Children and Families (Feb. 26, 2001).
79. See FLA. STAT. § 39.407(5), (5)(c) (2000). "Suitability for residential treatment"
means that the qualified evaluator has found that: 1) the child appears to have an emotional
disturbance serious enough to require residential treatment and is reasonably likely to benefit
from treatment; 2) the child has been provided a clinically appropriate explanation of the
nature and purpose of treatment; and 3) all less restrictive modalities of treatment have been
considered, and a less restrictive alternative offering comparable benefits to the child is
unavailable. § 39.407(5)(a)3.
These standards, which allocate to the "qualified evaluator" the principal role in
determining a child's suitability for placement in a residential setting, appear to be derived
from Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979). In Parham, the Court noted that the ques-
tions of whether to have a child institutionalized for mental health care "are essentially medi-
cal in character," that provision of a "neutral [non-judicial] factfinder" adequately protects
against erroneous admission, and that judicial review does not heighten the reliability and
validity of the psychiatric diagnosis. Id. at 607.
80. FLA. STAT. § 39.407(5)(d) (2000).
81. § 39.407(5)(f)-(g).
82. § 39.4 07(5)(g)(2).
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ninety days after the initial three-month review by the juvenile court.
8 3
Additionally, the court may order the child be placed in a less restrictive
setting any time the court determines the child is not "suitable" for continued
residential placement .8
The legislation is notably silent on whether pre-commitment adversarial
hearings are required, although the statute permits DCF to involuntarily
examine or place the child in a residential treatment setting pursuant to
section 394.463 or section 394.467 of the Baker Act.85 The statute, while
mandating the appointment of a guardian ad litem, is also silent on whether
appointed legal counsel for the child is required. 86 The pre-commitment
hearing procedures and the requirements of appointed counsel are the sub-
jects of a proposed rule of Juvenile Procedure, which the Supreme Court of
87Florida is currently considering in the aftermath of the M. W. decision.
III. THE FLORIDA STATUTES
The statutes at issue in M.W. v. Davis were sections 39.407(4) and
394.467 of the 1998 Florida Statutes. At the time of Michael's commitment
to the locked program, section 39.407(4) provided that, "if it is necessary to
83. § 39.407(5)(h).
84. § 39.407(5)(g)(4).
85. § 39.407(5). The legislation's focus on the post-commitment procedures concern-
ing a child's suitability for residential placement, rather than pre-commitment procedures, was
due in part to the legislature's awareness that the pre-commitment procedures were the subject
of the M.W. case, then pending before the Supreme Court of Florida. See SENATE STAFF,
supra note 48. Ironically, the supreme court's decision in M.W. issued on May 4, 2000, the
day before the Senate vote on SB 682, noted that "legislation is pending that would explicitly
set forth certain procedures to be used before a child who has been adjudicated dependant may
be placed in a residential psychiatric facility. The amendment of section 39.407 would be an
important step in specifying what steps are required to be taken before a child may be placed
in residential treatment." M.W., 756 So. 2d at 107 n.34 (citations omitted). This stand-off
between the legislature and the judiciary inevitably forced the original purpose of the law,
namely to establish court hearings before the child's placement in order to avoid an erroneous
commitment to a residential facility, to fall into the cracks.
86. Cf. FA. STAT. § 39.4085(20) (2000) (establishing as a goal for children in shelter
and foster care that "a guardian ad litem [should be] appointed to represent, within reason,
their best interests and, where appropriate, an attorney ad litem [should be] appointed to
represent their legal interests").
87. See In re Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Case No. SCOO-2044,
Placement of Child in Residential Mental Health Treatment Facility (noting that when
originally filed, SB 682 required a court hearing before placement of a child in a residential
treatment facility; but this provision was "affirmatively removed" by the legislature and
replaced with the "extensive process" of evaluations, reports and reviews, due process
safeguards similar to those in Parham).
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place the child in a residential facility for such [mental health] services, the
procedures and criteria established in s. 394.467 or chapter 393 shall be
used. . .. "88 This statute cross-referenced section 394.467, commonly
known as the "Baker Act," which provides that before a person may be
involuntarily placed for psychiatric treatment, there must be a finding by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the person is mentally ill, cannot care
for himself, or is likely to "inflict bodily harm," and that a less restrictive
setting cannot provide the necessary treatment for the patient.8 9
Prior to M.W., several Florida district courts of appeal had unanimously
ruled a court could not commit a child in state custody through delinquency
proceedings to a psychiatric institution without following the Baker Act's
procedures. 90 In addition, in a case where the child's parent appeared to
oppose the child's commitment, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal
had ruled that the child could not be committed unless the requirements of
the Baker Act were met.9'
Moreover, in L.W., the Fourth District held that the court could not
order a dependent child in the DCF's legal custody to be placed in a thera-
88. FLA. STAT. § 39.407(4) (2000).
89. Chapter 394 also specifically references the involuntary placement provisions of
section 394.467 of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 394.490-.4985 ("Comprehensive
Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services" ). Section 394.492(6) of the Florida Statutes
defines a child or adolescent who has a serious emotional disturbance or mental illness as
including a child or adolescent who meets the criteria for involuntary placement under section
394.467(1). See also FLA. STAT. § 394.492(5) (defining "'a child or adolescent who has an
emotional disturbance"' as not including "a child or adolescent who meets the criteria for
involuntary placement under s. 394.467(1)").
90. See Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. A.E., 667 So. 2d 429, 429 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (directing that proceedings to commit a child to a mental health facility be
commenced under FLA. STAT. §§ 39.046, 394.467, and 393.11), T.L. v. State, 670 So. 2d 172,
174 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "chapter 39 specifically cross-references
chapter 394 in providing that if it is necessary to place a child in a residential facility for
mental health services, the procedures and criteria established in chapter 394 shall be used");
Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. State, 655 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(declaring that it was error for the trial court to order the child committed to an interim long-
term residential mental health placement without following the procedures of the Baker Act);
see also State ex rel Smith v. Brummer, 426 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1982) (indicating that while the
Public Defender's Office was authorized to represent a child in a chapter 394 involuntary
commitment proceeding, the Public Defender's Office could not file a class action on behalf
of all children similarly situated).
91. In re L.A., 530 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing the trial
court's commitment of a child to a mental health hospital because the involuntary commitment
criteria of section 394.467(l)(a)2.a. and 394.467(l)(b) were not met).
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peutic facility without following the provisions in the Baker Act.92 Ironi-
cally, in L.W., it was DCF that objected to the order of placement and ap-
pealed the court's order, arguing that the Baker Act involuntary placement
procedures apply to children in both shelter and foster care.93 DCF objected
to the court order not on the basis of any articulated interest in the child's
well-being or needs, but on the basis of a "lack of financial funding."
94
In Michael's case, a lack of resources, namely a sufficient array of
therapeutic foster homes, was the guiding reason that DCF placed him in a
locked psychiatric facility.95 Unlike L.W., in M.W., the Fourth District was
presented with a case where DCF placed a foster child in a psychiatric
facility, but it was the child who objected. The Fourth District ruled that this
was a "voluntary" placement that did not require the Baker Act, since the
child was in the Department's legal custody and the Department placed him.
In reviewing the Fourth District's decision in M.W., the Supreme Court
of Florida did not hold that Michael's commitment was a "voluntary" place-
ment. Instead, the court ruled that since section 39.407(4) of the Florida
Statutes referenced children in the "physical custody" of DCF, it did not
apply to children in DCF's legal custody.96 Thus, the Supreme Court of
Florida rejected the Fourth District's holdings in both LW. and M.W. that the
statute applied to children in both the agency's physical and legal custody.
During the pendency of the M. W. litigation, the legislature replaced the term
"physical custody" in section 39.407(4) with the phrase "out-of-home
care., 97 Michael argued this amendment clarified the provision applied to
all children who are in out of home care, including those children who are in
the legal custody of DCF. However, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected
this argument and ruled this statute did not apply to foster children in DCF
legal custody.98
As noted above, during the 2000 session the legislature further amended
section 39.407 of the Florida Statutes to require a "suitability examination
and assessment" conducted by a "qualified evaluator" for any child that DCF
92. In re L.W., 615 So. 2d 834, 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and
remanding the trial court's commitment of a dependent child to residential treatment because
the court failed to follow the provisions of sections 39.407(4) and 394.467(1)).
93. Id. at 836.
94. Id.
95. DCF, in its briefs to the Supreme Court of Florida in M.W., acknowledged that its
decision to institutionalize a child in a psychiatric facility involves not only "a best interest of
the child calculus" but also "budgetary and availability constraints," an especially disturbing
position to take in view of the needs of children for a continuum of care irrespective of the
budgetary constraints.
96. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 109 (2000).
97. See H.B. 2347 (Fla. 2000).
98. Id. at 109.
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seeks to place in a residential facility, in addition to other procedures.
Although the court held that neither the statutory framework nor the Four-
teenth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the child's com-
mitment, in directing the Juvenile Court Rules Committee to develop proce-
dures for commitment that afford the child a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard," the Committee had to consider both the Supreme Court of Florida's
ruling in M.W. v. Davis and the recent amendment to section 39.407 of the
2000 Florida Statutes. Additionally, the priVacy interests of the child, under
the Florida Constitution is a consideration in the promulgation of the proce-
dural rule, if the child is to have a truly "meaningful opportunity to be heard"
prior to the loss of his liberty.9
IV. A MINOR' S RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
In M.W., the Supreme Court of Florida declined to address a child's
right to privacy under the Florida Constitution, but such a right should be
taken into account by the court in adopting a rule of court that governs a
foster child's commitment to a residential facility. Florida's citizens chose
in 1980 to include an explicit right to privacy in the state constitution guar-
anteeing that "every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
government intrusion into his private life."' 0° As the Supreme Court of
Florida has stated, minors are "persons" in the eyes of the law, and
"[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults .... possess constitutional rights."
10'
In In re T. W., the Supreme Court of Florida first established that minors
have the right to privacy under the Florida Constitution and that this privacy• 102
right extends to medical procedures. Additionally, the court has extended
the right to choose or reject medical treatment, under the Constitution's
guarantee of a right to privacy, to incompetent or incapacitated persons,
99. Id.
100. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. "'Privacy' has been used interchangeably with the
common understanding of the notion of 'liberty,' and both imply a fundamental right of self-
determination subject only to the state's compelling and overriding interest." In re Guardian-
ship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1990).
101. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
102. Id. (holding that the right to privacy under the Florida Constitution encompasses a
minor's right to consent to an abortion without first obtaining parental consent or court
authorization); see also Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994) (indicating that a minor's
privacy right extends to other medical and surgical procedures besides abortion, and to the
"conduct of others," including the state).
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because "the right of privacy would be an empty right were it not to extend
to competent and incompetent persons alike.
' 1t 3
In T.W., the court ruled that the child's right to privacy included her
own decision as to whether to terminate her pregnancy.104 Thus, the minor
obtained the right to make the decision about whether to have a medical
procedure that affects her body. 105 Michael and other foster youth have not
sought the decision-making autonomy that the Supreme Court of Florida
accorded to T.W. under the Florida Constitution's privacy clause. Indeed,
foster children like Michael do not seek to make the decision as to whether
they will be committed to a psychiatric institution. Rather, these children
seek meaningful due process before their privacy is invaded by institution-
alization at locked psychiatric facilities where their bodies are forcibly and
involuntarily subjected to four-point restraints, seclusion, and psychotropic
medications.
In Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,10 6 the Supreme Court
of Florida first established the appropriate test to be applied when the right
to privacy is implicated:
The right to privacy is a fundamental right which we believe de-
mands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the
burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The
burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through
the use of the least intrusive means.
10 7
In reviewing the state's intrusion on a minor's fundamental right to privacy,
the supreme court applied the Winfield test.108 With regard to the first prong
of the test, the court reiterated that the burden is on the state to prove that it
has a compelling, not merely significant, state interest before the state can
impinge on a minor's privacy right:
We agree that the state's interests in protecting minors and
in preserving family unity are worthy objectives. Unlike the fed-
103. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 12 & n.9 (defining "incompetent"
and "incapacitated" persons, to whom the right of privacy extends, as "those individuals
unable to make medical decisions on their own behalf' and holding that the constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment is not lost or diminished by virtue of mental incapacity or
incompetence); see also J.F.K. Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
104. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1189.
105. Id.
106. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
107. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
108. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193.
2001]
Nova Law Review
eral Constitution, however, which allows intrusion based on a "sig-
nificant" state interest, the Florida Constitution requires a "compel-
ling" state interest in all cases where the right to privacy is impli-
cated.
10 9
The court acknowledged that, where minors are concerned, the State
has worthy interests in protection of the immature minor and in preservation
of the family unit. However, the court specifically held that "neither of these
interests is sufficiently compelling under Florida law to override Florida's
privacy amendment."1 0 In the context of psychiatric treatment, although the
state similarly has an interest in protecting foster children because they are
minors, the Supreme Court of Florida has already established the state's
interest in protecting minors is not sufficiently compelling to override the
minor's constitutional right to privacy.
Even if the state had a compelling interest that outweighed the minor's
privacy right, it cannot commit a minor in its custody to a long-term, locked
psychiatric institution without providing the minor due process, because the
state must accomplish its objective through use of the least intrusive means,
which is the second prong of the Winfield test."' In reviewing the state's
intrusion on a minor's right to privacy, and the means of furthering the
state's interest, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that "[a]ny inquiry
under this prong must consider procedural safeguards relative to the intru-
sion."
' 112
In the M. W. litigation, DCF contended that it could commit a minor in
its custody to a long-term, locked psychiatric institution, subject only to the
judicial review provisions of chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes."3 However,
109. Id. at 1195 (quoting Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547 ). The court in T.W. noted that
an unemancipated minor could give consent to any medical procedure pertaining to her
pregnancy or care for her unborn child, pursuant to section 743.065 of the Florida Statutes,
regardless of its intrusiveness or potential danger. Id. However, the same unemancipated
minor was prohibited from giving consent for an abortion under the challenged 1988 statute,
section 390.001(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Id.
110. In re T.W., 551So. 2dat 1194.
111. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
112. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195-96; see also Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d
1099, 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that when the right of privacy is involved,
"the means to carry out such a compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored in the least
intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the individual").
113. FLA. STAT. § 39.701 (2000). The court has continuing jurisdiction to periodically
review the status of the dependent child, including the progress being made to place the child
for adoption, the status of independent living services being provided to an adolescent child,
the financial support given to the child by the child's natural parents, and the compliance of
the parties with their tasks in the case plan, among other items. Id.; see also In re L.W., 615
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these provisions are not sufficient to authorize the child's commitment to a
psychiatric institution against the child's will, as they do not mandate notice
to the child, an opportunity for the child to be heard, or the appointment of
counsel if the child contests his commitment. Indeed, as the supreme court
noted:
Considering the statutory framework of Chapter 39 and the ongo-
ing judicial review once a child is adjudicated dependent, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that the Legislature would require different
procedures to apply when the Department takes the extraordinary
step of requesting the court to order residential mental health
treatment for a child who is not yet in its temporary legal custody
versus a child who has been adjudicated dependent and placed in
the Department's legal custody.
1 14
Thus, these provisions are constitutionally inadequate to withstand the test
established by the Supreme Court of Florida when the fundamental rights
implicated here are at stake because they contain no procedural safe-
guards."
5
In formulating a procedural rule that provides a dependent child a
"meaningful opportunity to be heard" prior to commitment, the court must
provide safeguards that, at a minimum, assure the child notice, the appoint-
ment of counsel, a pre-placement hearing, the opportunity to be present at
the hearing, and to present and rebut evidence.
In the M.W. decision, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that one of
the purposes of chapter 39 is "[t]o provide judicial and other procedures to
assure due process through which children... are assured fair hearings by
a... respected court... and enforcement of their constitutional and other
legal rights ... .,,16 The court observed that although there are abundant
procedures concerning other aspects of treatment and care for children in the
dependency system, no statute or rule specifically set forth procedures that
DCF and the court must follow to place a child in a residential facility for
mental health treatment. 7 The court noted:
So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (purpose of judicial review is to assure that the state
is making reasonable efforts to promote adoptive placement or return the child to the family
unit).
114. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 105 (Fla. 2000).
115. See Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 544.
116. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 106 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)() (2000)).
117. Id. at 106.
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[N]either Chapter 39 nor our own procedural rules adequately ad-
dress whether an attorney for the child should be appointed before
a commitment to a residential facility takes place, what type of
hearing is required, what standard of proof should apply and
whether the child should have the right to put on evidence before
the court orders a placement in a residential psychiatric facility. "
8
Moreover, because the amendment to section 39.407 is insufficient to
ensure what type of hearing is required, what standard of proof should apply
and whether the child should have the right to put on evidence before the
court orders a placement in a residential treatment facility, it is especially
critical that the rule adopted by the court afford children with safeguards that
protect the privacy interests under the Florida Constitution.
V. THE RULE OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE
Although the court in M. W. did not reach the constitutional question
under Florida's right to privacy clause, it did hold that there must be proce-
dural safeguards that give the child a meaningful opportunity to be heard. It
urged the Juvenile Court Rules Committee to consider a proposed rule
submitted by the Guardian ad Litem program amicus, to look at rules in
other jurisdictions and in particular the New Jersey procedural rules address-
ing this issue." 9 In essence, then, in formulating an appropriate procedural
118. Id. at 106-07 (internal footnotes omitted).
119. While New Jersey was the one state identified by the court, it should be noted that
several other states' supreme courts have already considered the constitutional rights of
minors facing psychiatric commitment and have granted minors due process protections,
greater than those afforded to minors under the Fourteenth Amendment, consistent with their
state constitutions. See, e.g., Washington ex rel. T.B. v. CPC Fairfax Hosp., 918 P.2d 497
(Wash. 1996) (granting a fifteen-year-old mentally ill minor's petition for writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the involuntary incarceration of the minor in a mental hospital
against her will violated Washington state law and the minor's constitutional right to liberty);
In re N.N., 679 A.2d 1174 (N.J. 1996) (holding that even though the state has an interest in
ensuring the mental .health of its children, that interest is not sufficiently compelling to justify
infringement upon a child's due process and liberty rights and ruling that a minor who is in
need of intensive institutional psychiatric therapy may not be committed without a finding
based on clear and convincing evidence that the minor without such care is a danger to others
or self); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982) (holding that a minor has a substan-
tial and protectable liberty interest in being free from the physical restraints attendant to
commitment in a psychiatric hospital); In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286 (Cal. 1977) (holding
that no interest of the state sufficiently outweighs the liberty interest of a mature minor (over




rule, the Supreme Court of Florida is considering the "procedural safeguards
relative to the intrusion."1
There are four main procedural safeguards at issue: 1) the right to
notice and to be heard; 2) the right to an attorney; 3) the right to a pre-
placement court hearing; and 4) the right to present evidence and to have a
burden of proof met.
The Juvenile Court Rules Committee drafted proposed Rule 8.350,
Placement of Child Into Residential Treatment Center After Adjudication of
Dependency, attempting to give consideration both to the court's directives
in M.W. v. Davis and the recent amendments to section 39.407 of the Florida
Statutes. 21 The proposed rule, approved by a vote of 18-7-0 (and by the
Florida Bar Board of Governors, 8-3) unfortunately failed to mandate coun-
sel, require a pre-placement hearing, define the standard of proof or spell
out what evidence, if any, the child could present at the hearing.122 It also
failed to consider amending rule 8.140(c), governing case plan modification,
as directed by the court. 123
The Committee's proposed rule required notification to the parties of
the child's placement in a residential treatment center, including the written
findings of the qualified evaluator, within seventy-two hours of placement;
the appointment of a guardian ad litem and/or represention by counsel; the
submission of a report by the guardian within fourteen days of placement,
including a recommendation regarding placement and a statement of the
child's wishes; discretionary appointment of counsel by the court upon
notification of the child's placement; the setting of a "status hearing" requir-
ing the presence of the guardian and/or attorney (but not the child) within
five working days after placement; and a directive to the guardian and/or
attorney to attempt to ascertain whether the child consents to placement.'1
4
The rule additionally set out procedures for an initial placement review, to
be set upon motion of any party or if the guardian's report indicates the child
objects to placement within the time requested by the moving party or within
fourteen days of the filing of the motion or the GAL report.
120. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195-96. In formulating juvenile court rules, the
Supreme Court of Florida has stated, "[w]e have the authority to establish proper procedures
for juvenile proceedings to implement constitutional rights." R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So. 2d
1167, 1171 (Fla. 1992) (holding that juvenile rule of procedure regarding a time period took
precedence over the legislative enactment).
121. The full text of the proposed rule is available at http://www.flcourts.org/sctl







Under the proposed rule, the placement hearing considers the follow-
ing: based on an independent assessment of the child, the recommendation
by DCF that residential treatment is in the child's best interest and that it is
the least restrictive alternative available; the GAL's recommendation; the
recommendation of the multidisciplinary case review committee, if any;
written findings of the evaluation and suitability assessment prepared by a
qualified evaluator.'2 Any party can present evidence concerning "suitabil-
ity of placement" at this hearing. The court is required to order DCF to
place the child in a less restrictive setting best suited to the child's needs if
the court determines that the child is not suitable for continued placement.12 7
Finally, the proposed rule, tracking recently enacted section 39.407(5)
of the Florida Statutes, requires an initial review hearing within three
months of admission, and continuing review hearing every three months
thereafter, until the child is placed in a less restrictive setting. The child
must be present at all hearings except the initial five day status hearing.1
2
1
The two issues that generated the most discussion in both the plenary
Committee and a Dependency Subcommittee were whether a pre-placement
court hearing was required and whether the appointment of counsel should
be mandated for every dependent child recommended for placement in a
residential facility.129 The disagreement over the appointment of counsel in
turn prompted a sharply worded Minority Report, which resulted from close
and conflicting votes on a draft of the proposed rule that read as follows:
"Upon notification that a child has been placed into a residential treatment
center, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the child."'
30
The proposed rule also prompted the filing of eight separate comments
critical of various aspects of the rule. The comments were filed by Univer-
126. Proposed Rule 8.350, available at http://www.flcourts.org/sct/sctdocs/proposed




130. See Amendment to FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100(a), 26 Fla. L. Weekly S171 (Fla. Mar.
15, 2001). The minority argued that a "'meaningful opportunity to be heard is the hallmark of
procedural due process," which requires fairness to the litigant, and that for a child to have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard in a commitment proceeding, the child must be repre-
sented by counsel. The minority stressed that the child as a separate party through his case
must be given the opportunity, through his lawyer, to subpoena witnesses, present testimony
and evidence, cross examine witnesses and present argument. The report also noted the irony
and inconsistency of mandating the appointment of counsel for the lay guardian, while
depriving the child himself of legal representation in this proceeding. Id. See also Dep't of
Children & Family Servs. v. I.C., 742 So. 2d 401, 406 (Fla. 1999) (stating that "the child, the




sity of Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic; University of Miami Law
Professor Susan Stefan and the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law; the
Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities; the Florida Public Defender
Association; the Florida Bar Public Interest Law Section; the Children First
Project at Nova Southeastern University; University of Miami Law Professor
Bruce Winick and Broward County Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren; and attorney
Karen Gievers, representing the Children's Advocacy Foundation, Inc. All
of the comments argued that the rule should, at a minimum, provide for
notice, counsel, and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before children
can be involuntarily placed by DCF in residential treatment centers. 3
The essential elements that the rule should contain, in order to comport
with the privacy interests of the child at stake in this type of proceeding, and
to afford the child a meaningful opportunity to be heard, are the following.
A. The Right to Notice and to be Heard
In M.W., the Supreme Court of Florida held that the foster child facing
commitment to a psychiatric institution must be provided "a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.', 132  The court recognized the importance of
"whether a child believes that he or she is being listened to and that his or
her opinion is respected and counts."' 33 Indeed, former foster children were
extremely troubled that they were not heard when critical decisions were
being made about their lives. A recurrent theme in their comments was the
importance of consulting with children and allowing them to share in, and
contribute to, decisions that need to be made.
134
The fundamental principles of due process require notice and the
opportunity to be heard, but a child in foster care is typically provided
neither. Chapter 39 provides for judicial review hearings at six month inter-
vals for children in foster care.135 With the recent statutory amendments,
chapter 39 now provides for judicial review hearings at three month intervals
for foster children placed in residential treatment centers. 136 However,
chapter 39 does not include the child among those who must be noticed for a
131. See generally therapeutic jurisprudence arguments of Winick/Lemer-Wren and
Stefan/Bazelon, as well as the high points of the other six comments.
132. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 109 (2000).
133. Id. at 108.
134. FESTINGER, supra note 1, at 281. "Some felt left, and others felt left out: 'They
always had conferences and you weren't in on it and they don't tell you what they discussed
about you ... then they write a report and you don't know what they've said.' Some felt that
general statements such as 'it's in your best interest' makes you feel like a client, not a
person." Id.




judicial review hearing, and it does not provide the child with the right to be
heard at a judicial review hearing.
1 37
The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that a child is a party
to his dependency case, 13 and therefore the child is entitled to receive the
same notice as any other party.139 The Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
further entitle the child to be heard at court hearings. 4 However in reality,
most children are not provided with notice of their hearings and are not
heard by the court.
For example, statistics compiled in the District XI (Miami-Dade
County) Florida Foster Care Review's Annual Data Summary Reports de-
monstrate that there is a near absence of children's participation in their
foster care review hearings. In a recent year, out of 1214 cases reviewed
with children over the age of ten, involving a total of 1766 children, only 234
children participated in the review hearings of their cases.14
On a daily basis in Florida, judicial review hearings take place in
dependency court, and every party is heard from, except the most important
party-the child. In addition, routinely only one party is present for foster
care review hearings and therefore only one party is heard from-the De-
partment of Children & Families. Without hearing from the child or from
anyone other than DCF, the court cannot know if it is being provided with
inaccurate or incomplete information, as frequently occurs.
The experiences of various clients of the Children & Youth Law Clinic
illustrate the need for the court to hear from them and to listen to them.
42
One client of the Clinic, upon reaching the age of majority, read her court
file and discovered various reports and evaluations submitted to the court
unbeknownst to her which contained inaccurate and prejudicial information.
This information had resulted in her commitment to a locked psychiatric
facility where she was subsequently abused. She described how she was
taken to the facility by her DCF worker and a police officer, without being
able to talk to a judge. It was not until she saw her court file and looked at
137. See § 39.701(5)(a)-(f) (notice must be provided to such persons as the social
service agency charged with the supervision, custody or guardianship of the child, the foster
parents or legal custodian, the parents, the guardian ad litem, among others but not the child).
138. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210.
139. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.225(c); 8.235(a).
140. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100(a).
141. DIsTRIcT XI FLORIDA FOSTER CARE REviEw's ANNUAL DATA SUMMARY REPORTS
(1997-98). Additionally, out of 1681 total reviews heard, children only had an assigned
guardian ad litem in 348 cases. Id.
142. See generally Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the
Law: The Failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 1
(1999) (discussing the importance of listening to the real foster care experts, the children
severed by the system).
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the numerous court orders in the file that she realized there had been regular
court hearings and reviews of her case from which she had been systemati-
cally excluded. Unfortunately, this foster youth's experience is typical of
the experiences of children in foster care who are committed to psychiatric
facilities.
Numerous foster youth have described to the attorneys and interns in
the Clinic & Youth Law Clinic their experiences and feelings when they
have been locked up in psychiatric institutions, subjected to seclusion, four
point restraints, the forced administration of potent psychotropic medica-
tions, and limitations imposed on family contact and visitation, without ever
having been heard by the juvenile court. Even if a foster child is not noticed
or heard in foster care review proceedings on a regular basis, as the child
should, the child must be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
proceeding involving the child's commitment to a locked psychiatric facility
where the child's liberty and privacy rights are at stake. No foster care
hearing regarding the child's psychiatric commitment should proceed with-
out providing the child notice and the opportunity to be heard directly by the
court.
The juvenile court in a delinquency proceeding in all certainty would
not proceed to adjudicate the child and thereby deprive him of liberty,
without first ascertaining that the child was provided notice and the opportu-
nity to be heard directly by the court. In M.W., the Supreme Court of Florida
stated: "[i]ronically, our rules provide more procedural protections in this
situation for children in the custody of the state because they are delinquent
than for those children who are in the custody of the state because they have
been adjudicated dependent through no fault of their own."' 43 A foster child
facing commitment to a psychiatric institution is entitled to the same notice
and opportunity to be heard as a delinquent child who faces the same com-
mitment.
In fact, in rejecting a proposal that juvenile detention hearings in delin-
quency proceedings be conducted through audiovisual devices rather than
the children's personal appearance in court, the Supreme Court of Florida
stated:
Florida's oft-repeated pledge that 'our children come first' cannot
ring hollow in-of all places--our halls of justice. Not simply al-
lowing, but mandating that children attend detention hearings con-
ducted through an audio-visual device steers us towards a sterile
environment of T.V. chamber justice, and away from a system
where children are aptly treated as society's most precious re-
source. It is time that we understand that these youths are indi-
143. See M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 n.36 (2000).
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viduals and require sufficient resources if we are to expect a
brighter tomorrow.... Personalized attention and plans are neces-
sary to properly address the multiple and complex problems facing
today's children.144
A foster child has as much of a right to be heard directly by the juvenile
court at a foster care hearing as does a delinquent child at a delinquency
hearing.
Further, a foster child facing commitment to a locked psychiatric insti-
tution through a dependency proceeding suffers the same loss of liberty and
privacy as a child facing the same psychiatric commitment in a delinquency
proceeding. In Michael's case, he could not understand why children placed
in the same locked psychiatric facility as he was placed had received a full
hearing before the juvenile court prior to being committed to the facility,
while he did not. Michael could understand that children do not have the
same rights as adults, and therefore he did not receive the procedural due
process given to the adults committed to South Florida State Hospital in the
mental wards that were yards away from him. However, he could not under-
stand why another child in state custody placed in a bed next to him, in the
same locked facility, had received so much greater procedural due process
from the juvenile court prior to being committed than he received.
B. The Right to Counsel
In addition to notice and the opportunity to be heard, a foster youth
must be provided with an attorney if the youth seeks to contest his or her
commitment. In T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida held that "[iln proceed-
ings wherein a minor can be wholly deprived of authority to exercise her
fundamental right to privacy, counsel is required under our state constitu-
tion." 145 Indeed:
A minor, completely untrained in the law, needs legal advice to
help her understand how to prepare her case, what papers to file,
and how to appeal if necessary. Requiring an indigent minor to
handle her case all alone is to risk deterring many minors from pur-
suing their rights because they are unable to understand how to
144. Amendment to FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.100(a), 25 Fla. L. Weekly S516 (Fla. Mar. 15,
2001) (internal citation omitted).
145. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989).
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navigate the complicated court system on their own or because they
are too intimidated by the seeming complexity to try.'"
The Supreme Court of Florida has required the State to be represented
by counsel in all dependency proceedings, including judicial review proceed-
ings. 47 In In re D.B., the supreme court held that counsel for the parent is
mandatory in dependency proceedings where the parent-child relationship is
in danger of being severed, but counsel for the child is discretionary. ' In
proceedings involving an infringement of the parent-child relationship, the
parent's attorney can adequately protect both the parent's and the child's
mutual constitutional right to family integrity. Thus, separate counsel for the
child is not necessary to protect the child's right to family integrity. How-
ever, in a dependency proceeding involving the child's commitment to a
psychiatric institution, it is the child's constitutional rights to liberty and
privacy that are at stake and there is no other counsel to protect this right.
Even if a minor is not ordinarily entitled to an attorney in dependency pro-
ceedings, the minor must be provided with counsel in a proceeding involving
his commitment to a long-term, locked psychiatric institution, as this pro-
ceeding would wholly deprive him of his ability to exercise his fundamental149
right to privacy under the Florida Constitution. Therefore, under these
circumstances counsel for the child is mandatory.
Finally, contrary to the Majority in its attempt to justify a rule that
mandated guardians but not counsel for children in these proceedings, an
appointed guardian is no substitute for legal counsel. As correctly noted by
the Minority Report, an attorney provides the child with important and
irreplaceable protection of a child's constitutional interests that a guardian
cannot provide:
146. Id. (quoting Indiana Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass'n v. Pearson, 716 F.2d
1127,1138 (7th Cir. 1983)).
147. Florida Bar Re: Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909
(Fla. 1989).
148. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980).
149. Not only is the child a party to his or her dependency case under chapter 39 and
the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, but the child is a "patient" and as such is protected
by the safeguards enumerated in chapter 394. Under section 394.875(10) of the Florida
Statutes, children placed in residential treatment centers are accorded the rights of patients set
forth in section 394.459. See § 394.875(10) (2000) Indeed, when placed in residential
treatment, "[c]hildren's tights, as specified in Section 394.459, F.S., for patients, shall be
safeguarded. Children shall be informed of their legal and civil rights, including the right to
legal counsel and all other requirements of due process. Receipt of such information shall be




The minority believes that this advocacy cannot be provided by the
guardian ad litem or the guardian ad litem's attorney, as set forth in
subdivision (a)(3) of the proposed rule. See § 39.820(1). Fla. Stat.
(1998). The American Bar Association's Standards of Practice for
Lawyers who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (ap-
proved by the ABA House of Delegates, February 5, 1996), pro-
vide that a child's attorney is charged with providing "legal ser-
vices for a child" and "owes the same duties of undivided loyalty,
confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due
an adult client." In contrast, a lawyer who is appointed as a guard-
ian ad litem is "appointed to protect the child's interests without
being bound by the child's expressed preferences." Thus only an
attorney for the child can properly advocate for the child and pro-
vide him or her with a "meaningful opportunity to be heard."'
50
C. The Right to a Pre-Placement Court Hearing
Procedural due process under the United States Constitution guarantees
that the states shall give every person "fair notice" and "a real opportunity to
be heard" in a "meaningful manner" and at "a meaningful time."'1 1 In M. W.,
the Supreme Court of Florida stated: "we cannot eschew the necessity for a
hearing before a dependent child is placed in residential treatment against his
wishes simply because other statutorily mandated hearings are already
required or because it would otherwise burden our dependency courts."'
The Juvenile Court Rules Committee was under the belief that it could not
mandate a pre-placement hearing for a child facing commitment to a long-
term residential treatment facility because the recent amendment to chapter
39 did not require such a hearing. However, the Supreme Court of Florida
can require that the child be provided a pre-placement court hearing.
153
150. See Minority Report; see also Jan C. Costello, Representing Children in Mental
Disability Proceedings, 1 CENTER FOR CHILDREN & TIm CTs. J. 101 (1999) (recommending
that lawyers for children in civil commitment proceedings pursue the client's legal interests
and avoid functioning as a guardian ad litem or therapist, and observing that "[b]y skillful and
zealous representation they must seek to empower the child client").
151. Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991)
(citation omitted).
152. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 109 (2000) (emphasis added).
153. In the M. W. decision, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that legislation was then
pending that would clearly set forth the procedures to be used before a dependent child may
be placed in a residential psychiatric facility. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 107 n.34. However, the
enacted legislation is silent as to a pre-placement hearing procedure, which makes the neces-
sity for such a proceeding through the Juvenile Court Rules even more critical.
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In addition to the child's rights under the Florida Constitution, the
circuit court has both the constitutional authority*54 and the inherent power
to protect children, which cannot be restricted by statute. The doctrine of
inherent judicial power is necessary for the court to protect its independence
and integrity and to make its lawful actions effective.155 As the Supreme
Court of Florida has stated, "[tihe invocation of the doctrine is most compel-
ling when the judicial function at issue is the safeguarding of fundamental
rights."156 The court stressed that "where the fundamental rights of indi-
viduals are concerned, the judiciary may not abdicate its responsibility and
defer to legislative or administrative arrangements.'
'57
The court's protection of children and their fundamental rights is
perhaps the court's most important inherent power. This inherent power,
which stems from the duty of chancery courts to protect the interests of
minors, is well-established. a8 Indeed:
Independent of statute or rule a court of chancery has inherent ju-
risdiction and right to control and protect infants... [Courts] must
exert the utmost vigilance to see that the rights of so protected a
class as that of infants are not infringed on or destroyed. The court
itself is, in legal contemplation, the infant's guardian.1
59
Although the court is the infant's guardian:
Courts lack the physical ability to efficiently carry out custodial
functions at all stages of dependency proceedings .... In recogni-
tion of this fact the legislature gave the courts the prerogative to di-
vest themselves of the actual physical care of children alleged or
adjudicated to be dependent while still maintaining the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the courts. All powers not expressly di-
vested by the court are retained by it. 
160
154. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b).
155. See, e.g., Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
156. Id. at 137.
157. Id.
158. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983). "'Chancery is the supreme guardian, and has the superintendent jurisdiction of all the
infants in the kingdom."' Id. at 949 (citing Cooper v. Cooper, 194 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (internal quotations omitted)).
159. Id. at 949 (citing Brown v. Ripley, 119 So. 2d 712, 717 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1960)).




"Indeed, it is not conceded that under our Constitution, vesting as it does the
circuit courts with equity jurisdiction, this Rower could, under our Constitu-
tion as it stands, be taken away by statute."
The Supreme Court of Florida holds that "[a] statute which attempts to
restrict the inherent powers will be broadly interpreted as laying down
reasonable guidelines within which the power operates rather than as a sole
or actual source of the power.' ', 62 Additionally, where the supreme court
promulgates rules relating to the practice and procedure of the courts and a
statute provides a contrary practice or procedure, the statute is unconstitu-
tional to the extent of the conflict.
63
In developing the new rule of court, as noted previously, the Committee
did not respond to the court's directive to consider existing rule 8.410(c) that
governs court approval of amendments to the child's case plan, but this is
integral to the proposed rule. The dependency court adopts a case plan for
each child in foster care, in which it orders the "type of placement," and
"type of home or institution" where the child is to be placed and specifies the
placement that is in the "least restrictive and most family-like setting avail-
able ... in as close proximity as possible to the child's home."'' This is not
just a requirement of state statutory law,165 and the existing juvenile rules of
court, 166 but is also a requirement of federal law. 16 7 Moreover, this is part of
the circuit court's constitutional and inherent power to protect children.
Once the court adopts the case plan, it becomes an order of the court. A
statute cannot authorize DCF to unilaterally change the conditions of the
child's placement, in contravention of the court's existing order. Michael's
own case provides a stark example, as his court-ordered case plan placed
him in a foster home, with the goal of reunification and regular family
therapy with his mother. In contravention of the court-ordered case plan,
DCF instead placed him in a locked psychiatric institution in another county
161. Cooper, 194 So. 2d at 281.
162. Rose, 361 So. 2d at 139 n.14; see, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 387 P.2d 738 (1963);
State v. Webb, 21 N.E.2d 421 (1939); Bass v. County of Saline, 106 N.W.2d 860 (1960).
163. Haven Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1991).
164. Although the court cannot name the specific foster home or facility where the
child is to be placed, it is well-established that the court can name the type of placement. See,
e.g., In re L.W., 615 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); In re F.B., 319 So. 2d 77 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see also Henry & Rilla White Found., Inc. v. Migdal, 720 So. 2d
568, 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (indicating that "the department and the court have
overlapping and concurrent power over matters relating to dependency and delinquency
proceedings").
165. FLA. STAT. § 39.601 (2000).
166. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.410, Form 8.967.
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 675-679a (2000).
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far away from his mother. This required a court-ordered amendment to the
168case plan, after notice and an evidentiary hearing.
A psychiatric institution where the child is subject to restrictive and
potentially hazardous treatment modalities is a drastically different type of
placement than a foster home. When the child's court-ordered case plan
requires placement in a foster home, DCF may move the child from foster
home to foster home without prior court approval. However, a change in the
type of placement from foster home to psychiatric institution requires an
amendment to the child's case plan, following notice and an evidentiary
hearing. 169 The court's constitutional authority to protect children mandates
a court hearing prior to the child's placement being changed to a locked
psychiatric institution.' 70
Moreover, when a child is involuntarily committed to a psychiatric
institution where the child is subject to physical and chemical restraint, as
well as a documented risk of serious mental and physical injury and even
death, the child's right to privacy under the Florida Constitution is clearly
implicated. A residential treatment center for children and adolescents
168. In the child's case plan, the court orders the "type of placement," and "type of
home or institution" where the child is to be placed, and the child cannot be placed in contra-
vention of a valid, existing court order. FLA. STAT. § 39.601 (2000). Additionally, while the
amendment to section 39.407 of the Florida Statutes is silent on the necessity for a pre-
placement hearing, chapter 39 continues to mandate that DCF, as temporary legal custodian,
can only provide a child with ordinary psychiatric and psychological treatment, unless the
court orders otherwise. § 39.01(70).
169. Where the child requires short-term hospitalization or treatment in a crisis
facility, then there is no need for the court to conduct a pre-placement hearing. However,
when the type of the child's long-term placement is changed from a foster home to a psychiat-
ric institution in contravention of the court-ordered case plan, then a pre-placement hearing is
required. Moreover, viewed from both the child's perspective and from the child's best
interests, the child should not be subjected to the intrusiveness and harmful effects of this type
of placement, nor should the child be bounced around like a "ping-pong ball," being sent to a
residential treatment center in a different county, only to be discharged by the court days or
weeks later.
170. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Florida noted in M.W., providing pre-
placement hearings for children facing long-term commitment to residential centers should not
be eschewed just because it would be burdensome to the dependency courts. M.W., 756 So.
2d at 109. In fact, the courts would not be unduly burdened by having to conduct such
hearings, as the number of foster care children in residential psychiatric settings represents a
relatively small percentage of the total population. For example, in Miami-Dade County the
number of foster care children placed in long-term psychiatric residential treatment facilities in
1999-2000 totaled only 94, representing only three percent of the children in foster care in the




utilizes "a variety of treatment modalities in a more restrictive setting,"'
171
including the use of psychotropic drugs, restraints, and seclusion. 172 Under
these circumstances, the "procedural safeguards relative to the intrusion'
7
should include a pre-placement court hearing.
D. The Right to Present Evidence and the Burden of Proof Required
In developing the rule, the court must also consider the question of the
evidentiary standard to be met. In M.W., the Fourth District ruled that
because the juvenile court has an "ongoing relationship" with a dependent
minor, the presentation of evidence is not necessary in court reviews involv-
ing the child's commitment to a psychiatric institution.1 74 In the ideal sys-
tem, a juvenile court judge does have an ongoing relationship with a child.
In reality, though, just as the dependent child often has a constant turnover
of social workers, so too does the child often have a number of juvenile court
judges presiding over the case during the time the child may spend in the
state foster care system. In addition, given the extraordinary number of
cases in each juvenile judge's docket, even if there is one consistent judge
presiding, it is difficult for a judge to recollect every child in his or her
docket. As demonstrated in Michael's case, even though there had been
several hearings before the court, the court stated at the start of the hearing
in which the child was committed: "I don't remember this child, so tell me a
little about the case.' 175 No judge can possibly remember the details of the
hundreds of cases in his or her docket. Without a meaningful hearing, the
court cannot know if it is being provided with erroneous or incomplete
information, as M.W. maintains occurred in his case, and has the potential to
occur in every case where a minor is being institutionalized by the state. In a
proceeding involving the child's commitment to a psychiatric institution, a
perfunctory hearing before the juvenile court does not provide the child with
171. FLA. STAT. § 394.67(22) (2000).
172. See § 394.875(10); FLA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 65-10.021(8) (discussing proce-
dures for use on children of mechanical restraints, canvas jackets, and cuffs and requiring
additional justification for other hazardous procedures or modalities that place the child at
physical risk or which are potentially painful); see also Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 216
(Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("we tend to forget exactly
what civil commitment means: [t]he person is taken out of society, deprived of liberty... and
involuntarily subjected to examination and treatment. There is very little difference between
this procedure and incarceration for crime"); Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla.
1987) (equating a psychiatric institution to a jail because of the facilities for enforced con-
finement).
173. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195-96 (Fla. 1989).
174. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 104 (Fla. 2000).
175. Record at 29, M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
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any meaningful protection. A child must be provided the opportunity to
present and rebut evidence in a proceeding where the child's liberty and
privacy is at stake.
Moreover, when constitutionally protected rights are being impinged
upon by the state, the state has a burden of proof, which can be no less than
clear and convincing evidence. 176 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Florida "has
consistently held that the constitution requires substantial burdens of proof
where state action may deprive individuals of basic rights."'177 In non-
criminal contexts, the court has held that constitutionally protected individ-
ual rights may not be impinged with a showing of less than clear and con-
vincing evidence.17 9 Chapter 39 does not provide any evidentiary standard
for the court to follow in judicial review proceedings, nor does it provide for
the rules of evidence to be followed at the hearing. Even if the rules of
evidence are not followed during judicial review hearings regarding the
child's general status, the rules of evidence must be followed in proceedings
involving the minor's commitment to a long-term, locked psychiatric institu-
tion, as the minor's constitutional rights are at stake.
As the supreme court has made clear, "[t]he seriousness of the depriva-
tion of liberty and the consequences which follow in adjudication of mental
illness make imperative strict adherence to the rules of evidence generally
applicable to other proceedings in which an individual's liberty is in jeop-
ardy."1 79 This is necessary because of the uncertainty and risk of erroneous
psychiatric diagnosis may result in inappropriate commitment to a mental
institution.1
80
Additionally, in the context of psychiatric commitment, the Supreme
Court of Florida has required the trial court, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, to "eliminate the possibility of successful treatment through some less
restrictive alternative. As one commentator has noted:
The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative found in mental health
law has its roots in basic constitutional doctrine. A state-imposed bur-




179. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481,489 (Fla. 1977).
180. See In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286 (Cal. 1977) (holding that neither the state nor
the parent has an interest in committing a child to a state mental hospital if the child is not in
need of treatment and if commitment is based on erroneous information and evaluation); see
also In re Michael E., 538 P.2d 231 (Cal. 1975) (establishing criteria for admission of minors
who are wards of the state where the state seeks to commit the minors to psychiatric institu-
tions).
181. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 490.
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den on a 'fundamental' right, such as certain liberty [or privacy] rights,
is constitutional only if the burden is necessary to further a compelling
government interest. Thus, if the government's interest can be pro-
moted by a means that imposes a lesser burden on the right, the more
burdensome means is constitutionally impermissible.1
82
VI. PARHAM V. J.R. AND THE NEW SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
In ruling that a dependent child must be provided a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to commitment to a residential facility, the court
rejected the arguments that Florida law and the U.S. Constitution afford the
child this right. The lynchpin of its decision in M. W., and the directive to the
Juvenile Court Rules Committee was its observation that:
While the child's best interests may in fact be paramount in
the eyes, minds and hearts of every participant in the dependency
proceeding, it is important that our procedures in dependency cases
ensure that each child is treated with the dignity to which every
participant in a dependency proceedings should be entitled. It is
true that the dependency court, a citizen review panel, the Depart-
ment and multiple psychiatrists and psychologists were involved in
M.W.'s case and all were concerned with his best interests. How-
ever, of paramount concern is the question of whether M.W. per-
ceived that anyone had his best interests at heart when he was
placed against his wishes in a locked psychiatric facility without
the opportunity to be heard.
Indeed the issue presented by this case extends beyond the
legal question of what process is due; rather, this case also presents
the question of whether the child believes that he or she is being
listened to and that his or her opinion is respected and counts. 13
Over twenty years ago, in 1979, the United States Supreme Court
decided Parham v. J.R., in which the Court ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar parents or the
182. Weithom, supra note 33, at 787 n.85. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
183. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So.2d 90, 107-08 (Fla. 2000); see MELTON, supra note 37, at
146-47 (stating that children obtain psychological benefit from procedural protections prior to
being placed in psychiatric treatment facilities).
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state from committing children "voluntarily" to a mental hospital. 1 4 In its
ruling, the Court relied upon an amicus brief submitted by the American
Psychiatric Association and the social science research prevalent at the
time.1as Two decades later, the social science research now stands inappo-
site. In Parham, Justice Burger stated that "[m]ost children, even in adoles-
cence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment."1 6 However,
this dicta by the Supreme Court is one of a number of outmoded "assump-
tions" that the Court relied upon in its ruling.
Indeed, the social science research now indicates that "at least in their
reasoning about treatment decisions, adolescents are indistinguishable from
adults."1 7 In a leading research study, clinical psychologists:
[P]resented hypothetical dilemmas about medical and psychological
treatment decisions to nine, fourteen, eighteen, and twenty-one-year
olds. The responses of the fourteen-year olds could not be differentiated
from those of the adult groups, according to any of the major standards
of competency: evidence of choice; reasonable outcome or choice; rea-
sonable decision making process; understanding the facts.
188
This empirical evidence indicates that:
[t]here seems to be ample basis for reversal of current presump-
tions in favor of a view of adolescents as autonomous persons pos-
sessed of independent interests regarding liberty and privacy. Ac-
184. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In filing his petition for habeas, Michael
did not seek his release from L ock Towns under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, because he knew that such relief would be precluded by the Supreme
Court's ruling in Parham. Michael predicated his relief entirely on the Florida Statutes and
the Florida Constitution, consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion in Parham referenc-
ing the state's ability to provide more expansive rights for children than allowed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and the need to provide greater judicial protection for wards of the
state.
185. Id. at 606.
186. Id. at 603.
187. Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social
Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 649 (1983-84) (citations omitted).
188. Gary B. Melton, Toward Personhood for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as
Values on Public Policy, 38 AM. PsYCHOL 99 (Jan. 1983); see also Susan D. Hawkins, Note,
Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment
Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075 (1996) (arguing that minors should be accorded due
process in contested medical treatment cases to protect their rights to informed consent, bodily
integrity, self-determination, and privacy).
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cordingly, psychologists should actively involve minors in decision
making about treatment and research, and policy-makers should
begin their analyses of issues involving adolescents with respect for
their autonomy and privacy.
189
In fact, both the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association now strongly support due process for adolescent
minors facing psychiatric institutionalization, particularly when the minor is
a ward of the state. Both associations have drafted or voted to endorse
model commitment statutes or approved guidelines for minors facing com-
mitment to psychiatric facilities that provide the youth substantial due
process prior to commitment.'19
In 1981, two years after Parham, the American Psychiatric Association
approved a set of guidelines for the psychiatric hospitalization of minors.
The guidelines, prepared by the Association's Task Force on the Commit-
ment of Minors, guarantee children over the age of sixteen the right to
contest an involuntary admission to a psychiatric facility, the right to an
involuntary commitment hearing, and the right to counsel at the involuntary
commitment hearing. 191 At the involuntary commitment hearing, the child
through his appointed counsel has the right to cross examine witnesses
favoring commitment and the right to present testimony and evidence in
opposition to commitment and/or in favor of less structured alteratives.1
2
In addition to these protections, the party seeking to commit the child
against his will has the burden of showing the court by clear and convincing
evidence that: a) the child has a mental disorder; b) the child is in need of
treatment or care available at the institution to which involuntary commit-
ment is sought; and c) no less structured means are likely to be as effective
in providing such treatment or care. If the court, after hearing the evidence
presented, commits the child to a psychiatric program, the duration of the
initial commitment cannot exceed forty-five days, with the next commitment
for ninety days, and subsequent commitments of six months.
More recently, the American Psychological Association's Division of
Child, Youth, and Family Services endorsed guidelines that provide similar
due process to youth facing psychiatric commitment.19 3 Both the guidelines
by the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric
189. Melton, supra note 188, at 99.
190. See generally Amer. Psychiatric Ass'n & Amer. Psycho. Ass'n Children's Model
Mental Health Code.
191. See generally http://www.psych.org/index.cfm.
192. Id.
193. See generally Guidelines for Psychological Evaluations in Child Protection








Commendably, the Supreme Court of Florida was able to see Michael's
perspective and understand how he felt when he was committed to a psychi-
atric institution without the opportunity to be heard by the court. 95 Providing
a minor due process in the context of mental health commitment enhances
therapeutic and psychological benefits for the minor. A number of research
studies have found that providing adversarial proceedings produces positive
psychological benefits for children. Empirical research indicates that "hav-
ing some control over the process (a form of control inherent in a truly
adversarial system) is likely to enhance a child's sense of perceived jus-
tice.., and perhaps decrease resistance to treatment if it ultimately is or-
dered." 196
Indeed, significant clinical evidence exists showing a greater likelihood
of the treatment succeeding when adolescents participate in the decision to
begin treatment.197 Contemporary research on civil commitment hearings
conducted by social psychologists and therapeutic, jurisprudence scholars
strongly favors procedures that "increase patients perceptions of fairness,
participation, and dignity, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will
accept the outcome of the hearing, will view that outcome as being in their
best interests, and will participate in the treatment process in ways that will
bring about better treatment results."' 98
A research study found considerable benefits resulting from allowing
adolescents to have judicial hearings prior to their commitment if they
objected to hospitalization. 99 The researchers reported hospital staff be-
lieved that giving adolescents a hearing if they objected to hospitalization
was "helpful to children" for the following reasons:
194. See generally http:lwww.psych.orglindex.cfm; http://www.apa.org.
195. See M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
196. See MELTON, supra note 37, at 139-41.
197. See Rochelle T. Bastien & Howard S. Adelman, Noncompulsory .Versus Legally
Mandated Placement, Perceived Choice, and Response to Treatment Among Adolescents, 52
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL, 171, 177 (1984).
198. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing,
10 J. CoNTEmp. LEGAL IssUEs 37, 60 (1999).
199. Alan Meisel & L.H. Roth, The Child's Right to Object to Hospitalization: Some
Empirical Data, 4 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L., 377-92 (1976).
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1. The procedure gave the child the opportunity to tell how he
felt. He had the opportunity to express his objection.
2. The procedure crystallized the issue of the need for treatment.
It made the child (and the family) confront the issue of
whether or not the child really needed or wanted to be hospi-
talized.
3. It made the child feel that he had been treated fairly; if he ob-
jected, he would have an impartial hearing.
4. The procedure afforded the child some measure of control
over his own destiny.
5. This procedure was a step in the patient's involvement in
planning for his own care.
6. The judge could only release the child if he did not need to be
hospitalized.mo
As one commentator noted: "[p]rocedural due process does not immunize
persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; it simply insists on a
degree of fairness and humanity.... To that degree the capacity of children
has nothing to do with their right to be treated fairly, decently, and humanely
by their government. They are entitled to such treatment not because they are
competent but because they are persons.2 1 Indeed, "the 'competency' of the
claimant bears little or no relationship to the issue of entitlement, primarily
where the liberties involved are aimed not at maximizing free choice but at
civilizing the process and instruments of state compulsion.",
202
Vin. CONCLUSION
The Children & Youth Law Clinic's perspective as counsel for foster
youth has given it a unique ability to see these proceedings from the eyes of
the child. Many clients have expressed feeling "like pieces of furniture"
when placed in psychiatric facilities without being seen or heard by the
court. They have described feeling "shut up" and "shut out" when deprived
200. Id. at 384-85; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (observing that that the
appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short the
essentials of due process-may be a more impressive and therapeutic attitude so far as the
juvenile is concerned).
201. See Leon Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?,




of the chance to speak to the judge to contest their placement or to correct
inaccurate information in the court record. Thus, it is important to view the
issue through the eyes of the child who faces commitment.
As one former foster youth has written: "[f]oster care begins with the
terror of suddenly losing family, friends, toys, clothes, siblings, relatives,
neighborhood, and home. A child faces strange surroundings, strange people
the indignity of a medical strip search, and questions that aren't nice.
''2°
When a foster child is placed in a residential psychiatric facility, the child
experiences the same feelings of loss, indignity, and dislocation. It is there-
fore essential that foster children be provided with meaningful due process
procedures and protection by the juvenile court prior to, as well as during,
their placement in psychiatric facilities.
Indeed:
The decisions in foster care often involve many, and sometimes con-
flicting, interests. The viewpoints of the children are, therefore, not
sufficient alone but need to be seen as a necessary part of the consid-
erations that determine the recommendations that are made. Such a
practice can be beneficial in the long run since it is almost axiomatic
that those who participate in making decisions are more concerned
about making things work out .... Surely a field that stresses the self-




Ultimately, it is hoped that the Supreme Court of Florida's willingness
to consider the feelings and perceptions of Michael and the psychological
benefits of affording the child a hearing, and most important, Michael's
valiant struggle to have his voice heard, will inform the court's consideration
of a rule of procedure that provides dependent children a truly meaningful
opportunity to be heard by affording them the right to notice, counsel, a pre-
placement hearing, and the right to present and rebut evidence of the need
for commitment in a psychiatric facility before the state can commit them to
these facilities.
203. Jessica Watson Crosby, Why Foster Care Can Never Be Reformed, FosTER CARE
YOUTH UNirrED, 32 (May/June 1997).
204. Festinger, supra note 1, at 296-97.
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